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Surveillance of Islamic 
Communities in the U.S. 
T. Cameron Swathwood 
Surveillance of Islamic communities in the 
United States has become a controversial 
issue in recent years. This article examines 
the reasons offered for the legitimacy of such 
surveillance, specifically the historical 
precedent and inherent beliefs associated 
with the Islamic worldview and the legal and 
practical considerations thereof. Finally, it 
examines the real-world implications and 
functions of surveillance like that practiced 
by the New York City Police Department in 
the aftermath of 9/11.  
In 2011, it came to light that the New York 
City Police Department had engaged in 
investigation and surveillance of local 
mosques, Islamic organizations, and 
communities throughout the city. 
Subsequent evidence, some as recent as 
2013, revealed that this surveillance had 
begun shortly after the attacks on 9/11. It 
consisted of measures like mapping of 
Muslim communities, businesses, and 
religious, educational, and social institutions. 
Furthermore, the NYPD deployed officers 
and informants to infiltrate mosques and 
monitor the conversations of congregants 
and religious leaders. Online postings were 
also monitored while information collected 
from these activities was entered into 
intelligence databases. Surveillance 
extended further to monitoring and 
investigating specific people who were 
perceived as respected or influential in the 
Islamic community.79   
Reaction to these revelations was swift 
and mostly negative. Regardless, a crucial 
question was neglected: Was this 
surveillance, and other surveillance like it, 
warranted? An open-minded review of the 
facts shows that this surveillance and 
investigation framework seems reasonable, 
as a Muslim community is more likely to 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/nypd_su
rveillance_complaint_-_final_06182013_1.pdf. 
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produce a terrorist for two primary reasons. 
The first of two subpoints here is historical 
precedent. Anti-American violence from 
assorted Muslim groups has been a factor of 
the status quo since the 1970s, to say 
nothing of the destruction wrought against a 
variety of other opponents. The second 
subpoint is the violence inherent in the 
Islamic worldview. As unpopular as it is to 
speak in such a manner in this day and age, 
the unfortunate fact is that Islam, when 
followed to its logical extent, demands a 
violent slaughter of all those who believe 
otherwise. This will be examined in greater 
detail later, as will the obvious fact that 
clearly not all Muslims choose to become 
violent. As the second main point, it is 
therefore not unreasonable to posit that 
those who hold to and attempt to order their 
lives by way of an ideology that promotes 
violence and seeks to destroy that which 
opposes it should be watched with greater 
scrutiny than those who do not. This article 
will examine both of these points in turn, in 
addition to legal and practical considerations 
and implications of such surveillance.  
The first reason that the Muslim Ummah 
(a term referring to the super-national 
worldwide Islamic community80) is more 
likely to produce a terrorist is that of historical 
precedent. If it can be shown that there is a 
repeated, focused, and damaging campaign 
of violence against the United States (to say 
nothing of attacks against other countries) by 
Muslim groups, then it is reasonable to 
expect Muslims to be a source of potential 
trouble. Since the failed triple car-bomb plot 
by Khalid Al-Jawary in 1973,81 there has 
been an extensive series of violent incidents 
against the United States, the most 
damaging committed by Muslim groups. 
These groups have been united under a 
series of different banners, but all have been 
                                                          
80 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Islam,” accessed 
November 27, 2013, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/295507/Is
lam. 
81 Adam Goldman and Randy Herschaft, “AP IMPACT: 
Freedom Looms for Terrorist,” Associated Press, 
accessed September 2, 2013, 
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explicitly Muslim. Supporting this point via an 
in-depth examination of the quantity and 
impact of terrorist incidents with regard to the 
motivation or orientation of the attackers is 
beyond the scope of this article, but a cursory 
examination reveals the same conclusions.  
The watershed event was clearly the 
suicide attacks in September 2001, but there 
have been other incidents both before and 
after. For example, the two bombings in 
Beirut by the Islamic Jihad Organization in 
1983 killed 304 Americans,82 and the USS 
Cole bombing in Yemen by al-Qaeda 
operatives in October 2000 killed seventeen 
sailors.83 All of these incidents and others like 
them indicate an unusual and increasing 
level of violence from Muslim groups.  
It is worth noting at this point that while 
Muslim terrorist attacks on the United States 
may be outnumbered in quantity by those of 
other orientations (far left-wing, far right-
wing, pro-earth, etc.), they are not outdone in 
the area of quality. Organizations whose 
motivations for violence stem from 
something other than that of Islamic terrorist 
groups tend to inflict fewer casualties and 
reflect less sophistication than that of Muslim 
groups, according to a survey of the 
University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism 
Database. A query of the top twenty 
deadliest terrorist attacks worldwide by 
casualty rate since 1970 reveals that Islamic 
groups hold three of the top five slots, and 
are the only transnational ideology featured 
in the top twenty.  
Center for Defense Information 
researcher, Mark Burgess, notes: 
The modern terrorist, most particular 
the religiously motivated one, [is] . . . 
notably less restrained in his 
methods and willingness to inflict 
82 Global Terrorism Database, GTD Identification 
Numbers 198304180001 & 198310230007, University 
of Maryland, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
83 Ibid., GTD Identification Number 200010120001, 
GTD Identification Numbers 200912250024 & 
201005010001. 
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casualties than many of his 
predecessors.84  
Continuing this line of argumentation, he 
discusses al-Qaeda’s quest to obtain WMDs, 
saying: 
Religious terrorists’ willingness to use 
such weapons reflects a readiness 
and eagerness to inflict mass 
casualties that secular terrorists 
would likely balk at as counter-
productive. This inclination towards 
higher levels of violence has 
emerged as one of religious 
terrorism’s defining characteristics.85  
The situation here can be compared to 
that of a sexual assault committed in a large 
city. If an old man, a middle-aged woman, 
and a middle-aged man are brought under 
suspicion by the investigation; the police will 
naturally look more closely at the middle-
aged man than the other suspects. This is 
not a result of a preexisting bias against all 
middle-aged males, but simply due to the fact 
that, historically, people that fit his profile 
have shown themselves more willing to 
engage in conduct of the type that just 
occurred. In other words, this middle-aged 
man is more likely to have committed the 
sexual assault due to the fact that middle-
aged men make up the majority of U.S. 
sexual offenders. In the same manner, it 
would not seem unreasonable to argue for 
“keeping a closer eye” on the Muslim Ummah 
due to its historic tendency to produce 
particularly violent offenders.  
The second reason increased attention 
should be paid to Muslim communities in the 
course of guarding against terrorism is the 
issue of the fundamental violence of the 
Islamic worldview. When the already-
established fact of the amplified danger of 
religious terrorist groups over their secular 
counterparts is coupled with the Islamic 
                                                          
84 Mark Burgess, “Explaining Religious Terrorism Part 
1: The Axis of Good and Evil,” Agentura.Ru Studies 
and Research Centre, May 20, 2004, accessed 
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85 Ibid.  
worldview’s preexisting inherent violence, 
the danger is increased. The first indicator of 
this point is the many violent passages in the 
Koran, particularly verses like Surah 9:5, 
which instructs Muslims to: 
fight and slay the Pagans wherever 
ye find them, and seize them, 
beleaguer them, and lie in wait for 
them in every stratagem (of war); but 
if they repent, and establish regular 
prayers and practise regular charity, 
then open the way for them: for Allah 
is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.86  
Standing in opposition to this is the fact that 
most Muslims do not appear violent. On the 
contrary, out of the estimated 1.5 billion 
Muslims in the world today,87 most have 
chosen not to engage in violence. To support 
this perspective of Islam as fundamentally 
nonviolent, Muslims are quick to point out the 
peaceful verses in other parts of the Koran. 
Unfortunately, they neglect mentioning a key 
Muslim doctrine known as the doctrine of 
Abrogation. Surah 2:106 says: 
 None of Our revelations do We 
abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but 
We substitute something better or 
similar: Knowest thou not that Allah 
Hath power over all things?88  
This references the primacy that more recent 
surahs take over the older ones. The 
problem arises when one consults a 
chronological list of the Koran’s surahs and 
notes that the newer Surahs are increasingly 
violent, calling for proselytization and forced 
conversion, presumably as the fledgling 
religion gained power and popularity in the 
Arab peninsula. Milder, more moderate 
verses like Surah 2:256, which says:  
Let there be no compulsion in 
religion: Truth stands out clear from 
Error: whoever rejects evil and 
86 The Holy Qur’an, M.H. Shakir (trans.), University of 
Michigan Online Book Initiative, accessed September 
2, 2013, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/k/koran/.  
87 Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 
 
88 Ibid. 
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believes in Allah hath grasped the 
most trustworthy hand-hold, that 
never breaks.89 
and was written 87th out of 114, have been 
abrogated and replaced by verses like the 
previously mentioned Surah 9:5, which was 
written 113th. Violence trumps peace in the 
Koran.  
Another point on the issue of inherent 
violence and therefore increased danger in 
Islam is the fact that Islam is not merely a 
religious faith, but rather a worldview system 
with sweeping implications for all of life. 
Iranian refugee Azam Kamguian writes: 
In countries ruled by Islamic law and 
where political Islam holds sway, 
writers, thinkers, philosophers, 
activists, and artists are frequently 
denied freedom of expression. 
Islamic regimes are notorious for the 
violent suppression of free thought. 
Often, as a government allies itself 
closely with Islam, any critics of the 
government will be accused of 
blasphemy or apostasy.90 
These troubling manifestations in domestic 
governance, coupled with the disturbing 
nature and perception of Islamic Sharia 
law,91 mark Islam as more than a simple 
religion, and indicate it deserves closer 
observation. Secular terrorist groups 
generally have as their motivation nothing 
more than a seat at the table in deciding how 
things are done in the status quo. However, 
religiously-motivated Islamic terrorists intend 
to destroy the table, everyone else at it, and 
the status quo itself, to paraphrase R. James 
Woolsey.92 
As Islam appears to be an ideology that 
influences individuals to commit acts of 
                                                          
89 Ibid. 
90 Azam Kamguian, IHEU, “The Fate of Infidels and 
Apostates under Islam”, International Humanist and 
Ethical Union, accessed September 2, 2013, 
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under-islam-0. 
91 Kevin Bywater, “Liberty or Islamic Law?” Summit 
Oxford Study Centre, June 28, 2013, accessed 
September 2, 2013, 
terror, the problem then is the religion itself 
and the ideas therein. Since it is impossible 
to fight an idea itself, which exists only in the 
minds of its followers, it must be countered 
by engaging its practitioners who choose to 
live it out to its fullest extent. In this case, a 
worldwide community of practitioners of this 
religion has produced offenders who have 
wrought more violence against the United 
States and its allies than other violent 
ideologies. Further, these practitioners hold 
to an inherently violent worldview, one that is 
based on subjugation. The odds, then, are 
simply higher that future terrorists will be 
found in a Muslim community. That which is 
nearest and dearest to every Muslim’s hearts 
(their faith) demands that they wage jihad, 
and as such, they seem more likely to do so 
than someone who has no such powerful 
internal stimulus pressuring him to violence. 
It is therefore not unreasonable to watch a 
worldwide community and its local 
concentrations for trouble when that 
community has shown itself prone to 
violence and holds to a forceful worldview 
which pushes its practitioners towards 
terrorist action. As such, it appears apparent 
that surveillance such as that practiced by 
the NYPD is reasonable. 
In the abstract, the surveillance is 
reasonable, but in the concrete, it may still 
face obstacles. In the United States, citizens 
enjoy a variety of rights and legal protections 
that would seem to prohibit the government 
from an uninhibited campaign of 
surveillance, investigation, and 
counterterrorist action. Increased scrutiny of 
Muslims appears sensible, but the legal 
questions still remain.  
A preliminary note should be addressed. 
Very rarely in the so-called legal discussions 
http://www.summit.org/blogs/summit-
announcements/liberty-or-islamic-law/. 
92 R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence 
(fmr.), “Countering the Changing Threat of 
International Terrorism,” August 2, 2000, accessed 
September 2, 2013, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
COUNTERINGTERRORISM/pdf/GPO-
COUNTERINGTERRORISM-1-3.pdf. 
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of this matter do actual references to the law 
or serious legal dialogue occur. In its place is 
reasoning like that used by the American 
Civil Liberties Union, which is leading the 
legal charge with a class-action lawsuit 
against the NYPD. The ACLU repeatedly 
says in its court complaint that the main 
problem the courts should have with the 
NYPD’s surveillance program is that it is 
done “because of [the plaintiffs’] religious 
beliefs and practices.”93 Specifically, they 
object to how in preliminary studies the 
NYPD conducted before beginning 
surveillance, they specifically set aside other 
religions (for example, distinguishing 
between the American-Egyptian Muslim 
community and the American-Egyptian 
Coptic Christian community) in order to focus 
in on the Islamic community.  
The other key issue organizations like the 
ACLU (and the 125-group coalition that 
supports their lawsuit)94 take issue with in the 
NYPD surveillance is that it watches and 
records conduct that is not illegal, and has 
not averted a single terrorist attack. 
However, they again ignore the fact that the 
Islamic faith appears to be a historically and 
inherently violent worldview. What defense 
can there be against something like this 
other than to watch its practitioners to see 
when the next terrorist plot will materialize? 
Further, they fail to point to any specific law 
that prohibits law enforcement from doing 
this.  
The main legal issue in play, then, seems 
to be the legality of law enforcement 
surveillance in the absence of an already-
committed crime or reasonable suspicion 
thereof. Previously, the NYPD played under 
a set of legal guidelines known as the 
Handschu rules. These guidelines stated 
that police could investigate constitutionally 
protected activities (speech, religious 
                                                          
93 Shamsi, “Raza v. City of New York.” 
94 Noa Yachot, “125 Groups ask DOJ to Probe Un-
American NYPD Surveillance,” American Civil Liberties 
Union, accessed September 2, 2013, 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-religion-
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probe-un-american. 
goings-on, etc.) only when they had specific 
information that a crime had been committed 
or was imminent. Undercover officers could 
be used only when necessary to a case, not 
as a way to subtly keep tabs on groups that 
that may pose a threat in the future. In 
addition, police were prohibited from building 
dossiers on people or keeping their names in 
files without specific evidence of crimes.95 In 
the days after 9/11, believing a change was 
needed, the NYPD formally requested that 
the federal court system do away with the 
Handschu rules. Matt Apuzzo and Adam 
Goldman write,  
The judge presiding over the 
Handschu case, Charles Haight . . . 
did away with the requirement that 
the NYPD launch investigations only 
when it had specific evidence that a 
crime was being committed. And he 
eliminated the rule that police could 
use undercover officers in political 
investigations only when they were 
essential. Most important for the 
secretly planned Demographics Unit, 
Haight ruled: ‘For the purpose of 
detecting or preventing terrorist 
activities, the NYPD is authorized to 
visit any place and attend any event 
that is open to the public on the same 
terms and conditions as members of 
the public generally.96 
In terms of the Handschu rules, which appear 
to be the only legal precedent in this arena, 
the NYPD’s conduct is legally acceptable.  
The key question remains: Is this 
surveillance legal? The answer is 
multifaceted. First, there is no law declaring 
it to be so, and no court has ruled that it is. In 
fact, what appears to be the only legal 
precedent available on the issue (the 
aforementioned Handschu rules revision) 
indicates this surveillance is perfectly legal. 
95 Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “The NYPD 
Division of Un-American Activities,” New York 
Magazine, August 25, 2013, accessed September 2, 
2013, http://nymag.com/news/features/nypd-
demographics-unit-2013-9/. 
96 Ibid.  
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As such, in one sense it is legal simply 
because it has not been declared to not be 
so. There is another aspect to this question, 
though, and it is the spirit in which most ask 
it: Should this surveillance be legal? 
However, attempting to answer this question 
by offering a legal opinion in this murky 
context is beyond the scope and authority of 
this article and author.  
The facts, then, seem to indicate two main 
points. First, Islam appears to be a 
historically and inherently violent faith that 
has shown a tendency to motivate its 
followers to violence. Second, surveillance 
therefore appears to be both reasonable and 
legal. As such, the final section of this article 
will seek to address the practical implications 
of the points made therein.  
Since most Muslims are not terrorists, 
courses of action such as open hostilities 
against or declaring war on the entire 
Ummah are morally reprehensible and out of 
the question, not to mention cost-prohibitive 
and inefficient. Surveillance and 
investigation would be the more appropriate 
measure, and the surveillance methods 
practiced by the NYPD appear an excellent 
place to start in reference to communities or 
geographical concentrations of Islam in 
America. Those sources cited at the 
beginning of this article provide a good 
overview of this surveillance. To these, it 
would seem reasonable to add an additional 
investigative layer; one that could focus on 
the bigger picture, the fact that it is not just a 
regional flavor of Islam that has a historical 
and inherent predisposition to violence. This 
level could seek to detect and investigate 
individual Muslims on a more personal level.  
Specifically, a nationwide program such 
as this could look for one or more personal 
“stressors” that, absent an Islamic affiliation, 
would be a non-issue, or at least, less of a 
concern. These stressors could include 
originating from a questionable country, 
seeking advanced degrees, being a member 
of a more fundamentalist sect, or professing 
anti-American or anti-Western tendencies. 
For example, a secularist from Yemen 
seeking to immigrate might not be an issue, 
but a practicing Muslim from Yemen would 
be, as that particular country has a high level 
of terrorist activity at this time. A secularist 
seeking a degree in nuclear engineering 
might not be important, but a practicing 
Muslim doing the same could be grounds for 
quiet investigation and surveillance, to assist 
in the preclusion of the AQ Khans of the 
future. Being a member of a more 
fundamentalist Muslim sect (Wahhabism or 
Qutbism, for example) could also be grounds 
for concern. In an example of multiple 
stressors, a practicing Muslim (first stressor) 
with anti-American sentiments (second) from 
a hostile country like Iran (third) seeking 
postgraduate education in chemical 
engineering (fourth) could be grounds for 
strong concern. In this way, surveillance and 
investigation could be appropriately and 
proportionately applied where needed most.  
As noted near the beginning of this article, 
this topic is unpopular. It is also apparent that 
it is a complex topic that merits more 
research and analysis than it is possible for it 
to receive here. Many, if not all, of the topics 
addressed and points made could be 
examined much better if given more space 
and time. Unfortunately, to do so here would 
be beyond the purview of this fairly limited 
article. This article is only intended to offer a 
new perspective or spark debate, not to 
provide an exhaustive review and analysis of 
this many-sided situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
